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Summary 
 
The main institutions responsible for governing international trade and health, the 
World Health Organization and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, were established after the 
Second World War.  The two domains largely operated separately for many decades 
within their respective domains.  The growth and expansion of world trade over the 
past half century amid economic globalisation, and the increased importance of health 
issues to the functioning of a more interconnected world, brings the two domains 
closer together on a broad range of issues.  This has given rise to a number of 
institutional challenges.  Foremost is the capacity of these institutions to govern their 
domains effectively, not only in carrying out their functional roles, but ensuring good 
governance.  Where trade and health issues come together, how well do existing 
institutions work together?  Fundamental questions have been raised on both counts.
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Bridging the divide:  The global governance of trade and health 
 
Introduction 
 
 At WHO’s 59th World Health Assembly (WHA), member states urged their 
governments to ensure that trade and health interests are appropriately balanced and 
coordinated, and relevant ministries work constructively to address public health-
related aspects of international trade.1  At the heart of achieving this balance are the 
institutions responsible for governing trade and health policy.  Numerous and diverse 
in their constituencies, and often unfamiliar with other sectors, these institutions are 
responsible for fulfilling this aspiration of a balanced and coordinated trade and health 
agenda. 
 This paper assesses the global governance of trade and health, broadly 
concerned with the organisations, institutional mechanisms, formal and informal 
rules, and decision making processes that collectively manage trade and health issues.  
What institutions have the authority and capabilities to take action on such issues?  
Who participates in, and who is excluded from, decision-making?  Who sets the 
agenda and defines policy goals?  As presently configured, there are clear challenges 
for strengthening the representation of health interests within the governance of 
international trade, as well as ensuring trade issues are dealt with appropriately within 
health institutions.  Concerted attention to these deficits will be needed before a 
balanced and coordinated trade and health agenda can be achieved. 
 
The global trading system:  Shaping the rules of the game 
 After the Second World War, new institutions were created to support 
international economic cooperation.  The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) was established in 1947 and presided over trade negotiations over the next 
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fifty years.  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995 as the 
GATT’s successor to formalise and expand international trade rules. Today, the 
WTO’s agreements are the central legal framework for international commerce. 
 The WTO dramatically changed the global trading system. The functions of 
the GATT were extended and binding disciplines on all countries were established, 
guarded by strict enforcement provisions (Box 1). The reach of the trade agenda 
expanded ‘behind the border’ and included new issues such as services, intellectual 
property and investment.  Trade negotiations now impinge directly on areas 
traditionally within the domain of domestic regulation including immigration control, 
environmental protection and public health. 
 
 
Box 1:  Key functions of the WTO 
 
• Providing a forum for negotiations among WTO members concerning their   
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under WTO agreements; 
• Administering multilateral trade agreements; 
• Promoting the transparency of WTO members’ trade policies and actions 
regarding the implementation of WTO obligations, through regular monitoring 
and surveillance; 
• Providing a process for WTO members to mediate and settle trade disputes; 
• Working in cooperation with relevant international organisations to achieve 
greater coherence in global economic policy-making. 
 
 
The WTO is a highly structured institutional framework. Foremost are 
Ministerial Conferences, six since 1996, which take decisions on matters related to 
any of the multilateral trade agreements.  Everyday operations are conducted by the 
General Council which acts on behalf of the Ministerial Conference.  It also meets as 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and Trade Policy Review Body to handle 
disputes and monitor national trade policies, respectively.  Below the General Council 
are the Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), plus various committees that report directly to 
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the General Council. The work of these three councils is further divided into 
committees and working parties. 
Given the expanded reach of the WTO, questions have intensified about its 
legitimacy and capacity to fairly balance the interests of diverse stakeholders.  
Criticism from member states, scholars and civil society organisations (CSOs) 
dramatically came to a head at the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999.  More 
recently, ongoing gridlock in negotiations under the Doha Round has renewed 
concerns about the governance of the trading system. 
 
How multilateral trade agreements are negotiated 
 In principle, WTO decisions are voted on by all member states, each having 
one vote.  In practice, virtually all decisions are taken by consensus, achieved “if no 
member, present at the meeting when the decision is formally taken, formally objects 
to the proposed decision.”2  The content of such consensus is traditionally hammered 
out in closed, informal meetings where much of the real agenda setting and deal 
making takes place. These include small-group retreats in Geneva and national 
capitals, informal gatherings of ministers, and “bilateral meetings” between select 
countries.  One common concern is that the major trading partners of the “Quad” (EU, 
US, Japan and Canada) dominate these restricted meetings, most notably the “green 
room” discussions, which involve a limited number of delegations (between 20 and 
40).  Many countries have expressed frustration about being excluded and then having 
decisions presented fait accompli.  Recent efforts have been made to include 
representatives of country coalitions in small group discussions and to report 
proceedings back to the full membership. 
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 Despite attempts to tinker with decision-making procedures, barriers to 
participation persist.  The ability to shape agreements crucially depends on the 
capacity of countries to meaningfully participate.  Many low and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) lack the resources to sufficiently monitor, let alone influence, 
negotiations. The average size of least-developed country delegations is two 
professional staff.  In contrast, the EU sends over 140 staff,3 in addition to capital-
based trade officials. The breadth and complexity of the WTO’s agenda (involving 
more than 60 committees) means many countries face real difficulties engaging in 
negotiations. Consequently, the priorities of countries with the greatest capacity 
remain dominant. 
 The disparities between rich and poor are also mirrored by differences 
between the international institutions that deal with trade and public health. As Paper 
1 described, trade governance is highly formalised and demanding, whereas global 
health governance exhibits little structural coherence, a greater diversity of actors and 
perspectives, and weaker legal obligations.  WHO also has limited access to WTO 
proceedings as an observer in areas where there are considered to be direct health 
implications from trade.  On this basis, WHO has observer status in the Committees 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade, and 
ad hoc observer status in the TRIPS and Trade in Services Councils.  Observer status 
allows WHO to follow, and provide inputs into, discussions but not be officially 
involved in decision-making.4 Importantly, the issues deemed to have direct health 
implications, and thus permitted representation by WHO, remain restricted.  
Moreover, the limited sharing of information between the health and trade 
communities, and the lack of substantive monitoring and evaluation of trade policies 
from a public health perspective, pose significant barriers to meaningful participation. 
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Settling Trade Disputes 
 The dispute settlement process in the WTO is a central pillar of the rules-
based trading system. When a member government believes another member is in 
violation of a WTO agreement, a complaint can be filed under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).  Between 1995 and 2005, 332 cases were brought, with the 
decisions taken creating legal precedent.   
 As strict enforcement provisions have become an integral part of the WTO’s 
functioning, intense debates have followed about whether the DSB adequately 
balances commercial and health interests.  Sufficient trade restrictions are required to 
protect the life and health of human, animals and plants. At the same time, health 
provisions need to be appropriately applied so as not to be open to abuse for 
protectionist reasons.  Concerns have been raised about the degree to which action to 
protect health can be taken before there is complete scientific proof of a risk.  Under 
environmental agreements, the precautionary principle supports the notion of action 
without full scientific evidence, given the risk of significant adverse impact.  
However, debate remains in the WTO about the legal status of the principle, as well 
as the necessary level of scientific evidence and the use of international standards and 
risk assessments. 
 Under the SPS Agreement, trade restrictions must be based on clear scientific 
evidence.  Although qualified exemptions are allowed where evidence is insufficient 
(Article 5.7), a precautionary principle has not been written into the Agreement that 
allows restrictions, which would otherwise be inconsistent with the rest of member 
states’ obligations under the Agreement.5 This is illustrated by the long-awaited ruling 
in March 2008 against the EU on the import of hormone-treated beef from the US on 
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the grounds of lack of inadequate scientific risk assessment.6  Overall, creating a 
mechanism for initiating precautionary measures to protect health, which ensures such 
actions are necessary, effective and do not cause undue conflict among members, 
remains a clear challenge.7 
 
Negotiating Trade Beyond the WTO 
 Regional and bilateral trade agreements (RTAs) form an increasingly 
important part of the governance of trade and health.  From 1990 to 2007, the number 
of RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO increased from 20 to 159.8  Today, over 250 
RTAs govern more than 30 per cent of world trade.9 
 A primary concern is that RTAs can include additional provisions that go 
beyond the WTO.  In many cases, these stricter rules have limited the flexibilities 
available to protect health.  For example, the US and European countries have pushed 
for stricter intellectual property rights (IPRs) than exists under the TRIPS Agreement.  
Since 2001 every trade agreement signed or under negotiation by the US has 
increased the terms and scope of IPR protection of pharmaceuticals, including patent 
terms beyond the twenty years provided for under the WTO.10 These so-called 
‘TRIPS-plus’ standards have been criticised for eroding the hard fought flexibilities 
recognised by the Doha Declaration.11 
 The protection of knowledge and genetic resources is another area where 
RTAs have potentially significant health implications.  Several agreements ease 
limitations on the patenting of life forms and protection of plant varieties. Under US 
free trade agreements, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Columbia will no longer be 
able to reject patent applications because a firm fails to indicate a plant’s origin or 
show proof of consent for its use from a local community.9  Under the Economic 
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Partnership Agreements (EPA) being negotiated between the EU and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, there are concerns that proposed IPR 
provisions will reduce the ability of farmers to save and share seeds, techniques that 
have enabled communities to select the strongest varieties to improve production.1213 
 
Setting National Trade Priorities 
 At the national level, a long-standing concern has been the relatively low 
status health policy receives alongside commercial interests in the setting of trade 
policy.  For example, in the US Trade Policy Advisory Committee system (a key 
mechanism of consultation of the US Trade Representative with the private sector and 
CSOs), a health representative was only recently added to two of the sixteen advisory 
committees.  These committees were respectively composed of 20 and 33 private 
sector representatives.  Despite a legal requirement that the committees reflect a 
balance of views, 93 per cent of the 742 advisors represent commercial interests.14 
Enjoying privileged access to government policymakers, businesses have 
unsurprisingly dominated the formulation of negotiating positions and have, in turn, 
exerted similar influence over the WTO agenda.  Many, including the pharmaceutical, 
services and agricultural sectors, have devoted vast resources to lobbying 
governments and, in some cases, basing permanent representatives in Geneva to 
monitor WTO proceedings. 
 In LMICs, the absence of health representation in trade policy is similarly 
marked. Securing favourable market access for exports has usually outweighed public 
health priorities (even when benefits are likely to be short-lived and eroded over time 
as tariffs progressively decrease). For example, the Peruvian and Columbian 
governments agreed to an FTA with the US that contained a broad range of TRIPS-
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plus standards, despite warnings by public health authorities of potentially disastrous 
effects from increased drug costs.11  In general, public interest groups exert less 
weight in setting priorities, and shaping the international trade agenda. 
 
Public health engagement with trade issues:  A big enough voice? 
 
 Engagement by health organisations in trade policy at the global level occurs 
in a multitude of ways, with the most formal links focused on WHO.  From 1948 until 
the 1990s, these links were narrowly circumscribed, mainly defined by the provisions 
of the International Sanitary Regulations (renamed the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) in 1969).  The original purpose of the IHR, dating from the 
nineteenth century, is to set out the responsibilities of member states in dealing with 
diseases and other health risks spread through international trade and travel.  Until the 
revision of the IHR in 2005, the regulations covered only a handful of acute and 
potentially epidemic diseases.  Specific measures to be taken, such as disease 
surveillance and reporting, regulation of ports of entry, and quarantine, reflected the 
trading interests of major trading states. 
 In addition to the IHR, the food trade has been additionally governed by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, created in 1963 by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) and WHO to develop food standards, guidelines and related 
texts.  The purposes of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme are to protect 
the health of consumers and ensure fairness in the food trade, and to promote the 
coordination of food standards by international governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations.  For member states, Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) allows governments to act on trade in order to protect human, animal 
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or plant life or health, provided they do not discriminate or use this as disguised 
protectionism. 
 The governance of trade and health issues remained focused on these two 
regulatory instruments for many decades, seen as largely dealing with technical 
matters and thus relatively uncontroversial.  However, the expansion of the world 
trading system, as described above, heralded a new environment where health 
determinants and outcomes could be influenced by trade in many more ways.  The 
creation of the WTO required new forms of engagement by the public health 
community.  Moreover, this expanded trade and health agenda has encompassed 
different interests, values and goals, thus representing a more politically challenging 
set of policy issues to address. 
 This more difficult policy environment was immediately signaled by concerns 
expressed over the potential impact of the TRIPS Agreement on access to medicines.  
The publication of the WHO report, Globalization and Access to Drugs, Implications 
of the WTO/TRIPs Agreement in 1997 by the Action Programme on Essential Drugs 
was ostensibly a defense of public health principles over trade.  Alongside the report 
was a proposed resolution to the WHA on a Revised Drugs Strategy which called on 
member states to “ensure that public health rather than commercial interests have 
primacy in pharmaceutical and health policies and to review their options under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to safeguard 
access to essential drugs.”15  Both the report and resolution were strongly criticised by 
the pharmaceutical industry and US government,16 instigating a further year of 
consultation and heated debate. 
 These initial wrangles prompted a realisation of the need for WHO to 
strengthen its engagement with trade issues, and to demonstrate “needed 
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leadership.”17  In 2000, a small programme on Globalisation, Trade and Health 
(GTH) was established to strengthen knowledge, develop analytical tools and produce 
training materials for supporting member states in addressing trade and health issues.  
Its first major report, WTO agreements and public health, was a wide-ranging study 
of how specific trade agreements relate to drugs and IPRs, food safety, tobacco and 
other issues “subject to passionate debate”.  Significantly, the study was jointly 
published by WHO and WTO, with their respective heads advising that “health and 
trade policy-makers can benefit from closer cooperation to ensure coherence between 
their different areas of responsibilities”.18  The price, according to critics, has been 
compromise.  Rather than confronting difficult issues, or advising ministries of health 
on how to protect health amid trade liberalisation, the study remained carefully 
worded and largely descriptive. 
 While the remit of the GTH has been to “achieve greater policy coherence 
between trade and health policy so that international trade and trade rules maximise 
health benefits and minimise health risks, especially for poor and vulnerable 
populations,” in practice, ensuring health policy is appropriately represented has been 
the real challenge.  Initially, the programme was located centrally within the Director-
General’s office, a reflection of then Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland’s 
desire for closer collaboration:  “We need WTO as an effective and fair forum for 
negotiating trade rules and resolving disputes.”19 
  The unclear priority given to trade issues within WHO has been reflected in 
the changing location of the GTH.  Formed in 2000 within the Department of Health 
in Sustainable Development, in 2002 it was moved to the Strategy Unit within the 
Director-General’s Office (DGO).  This was seen as reflecting high-level support for 
its work by Brundtland.  However, under the late Lee Jong-wook, it was moved out of 
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the DGO to a new Department of Ethics, Trade, Human Rights and Health Law 
(ETH) where it produced legal reviews of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS), Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS).  In 2007, under Margaret Chan, the 
programme was then incorporated into the new department on Ethics, Equity, Trade 
and Human Rights, created by merging the departments, for Ethics, Trade, Human 
Rights and Law and for Equity, Poverty, Social Determinants of Health.  The 
programme has been responsible for Chan’s new initiative on global health 
diplomacy, including the “especially challenging area” of trade and health.20  
Throughout, the programme has been strongly reliant on extrabudgetary funds (EBFs) 
and, with few WHO staff, on external consultants to provide technical expertise.  
Without substantial core funding, GTH has been vulnerable to donor preferences 
which generally favour funding of infectious diseases over politically sensitive issue 
areas such as trade.  Indeed, the uncertain status of GTH throughout this period has 
been invariably influenced by political pressures asserted by the US government and 
powerful corporate interests seeking to circumscribe the organisation’s involvement 
in trade issues, notably in relation to the FCTC and access to medicines.  According to 
NGOs, the financial dependence of WHO on major donors, amid the proliferation of 
other global health initiatives, led the organisation to act with a degree of caution.  In 
addition, beginning under Brundtland, individuals from the pharmaceutical industry 
had been recruited to prominent positions within the organization.21   The 
organisation’s support for using industry discounted, rather than generic drugs, and its 
failure to speak out definitively in support of countries such as Thailand, India and 
South Africa seeking to uphold TRIPS flexibilities,22,23 have been seen as examples of 
this reticence to offend certain interests. 
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 The issue of access to medicines has remained a barometer for assessing 
WHO’s institutional capacity and willingness to engage with trade issues.  The 
creation of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public 
Health in 2003, and location within the DGO, has been welcomed as a political 
compromise between a proposal by Kenya and Brazil for a global mechanism to 
provide financial support for public health needs-driven research; and industry 
support for market-driven solutions.  Whether the Commission will be able to put 
forth any specific recommendations, after several years of prolonged debate, remains 
uncertain.  Public health advocates continue to look to WHO to play a more assertive 
role.  As Rodrigo Estrela of Brazil’s UN mission in Geneva states, “Developed 
countries used to say IP rights were not an issue for WHO, but instead for WTO… 
WHO has work to do in this area, including supporting measures contained in TRIPS 
regarding flexibilities.”24 
 The trickiness of dealing with trade and health issues was also evident in the 
revision of the IHR.  After a prolonged process of delay, this was achieved in 2005 
only after the SARS outbreak in 2003 focused the minds of donors.  While trade has 
remained central to its purpose, “to prevent, protect against, control and provide a 
public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are 
commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade,”25 its measures now reflect the 
broader scope and scale of international trade today.  The IHR (2005) represent what 
can be achieved when there are shared goals between the trade and health 
communities.   Where commonalities are less evident, however, WHO faces greater 
challenges.  As Ford and Piédagnel write, 
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In the face of rising infectious diseases such as AIDS, TB, and malaria, and 
the increasing marginalisation of health problems that do not affect the 
developed world, the importance of an international, independent organisation 
that is brave, aggressive, and vocal in its defence of global public health has 
never been more important.22 
 
 
 
Restacking the deck:  Protecting and promoting health within a global trading 
system 
 There is significant potential for the global trading system to bring widespread 
benefits to societies worldwide.  However, the breakdown and current impasse in 
multilateral trade negotiations signals dysfunction in the current governance of trade, 
arising from widely held dissatisfactions with existing institutions.  The weak 
representation of health concerns within trade governance has been an important part 
of this disgruntlement.  If the global trading system is to be sustainable, it must 
operate in a fair and ethical way which includes sensitivity to social and 
environmental needs.  How then can the public health community play a more 
effective role in the governance of trade and health? 
 At the global level, the lack of coherence in global health governance is a 
major hindrance to more effective representation.  The patchwork of institutional 
mandates, activities, authority and resources characterising global health initiatives 
reflects the absence of an agreed plan or strategic vision to tackle the broad 
determinants of health including trade.26 Concerted efforts to designate clear 
leadership on trade and health issues within the public health community are needed. 
 If WHO is to take a lead role, the involvement of WHO with the WTO 
Secretariat and its members could be substantively enhanced.  WHO should become a 
permanent observer of the WTO’s general council, and DSB panels should involve 
equal participation of trade and health experts in appropriate cases.  Also, cooperation 
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agreements by the IMF and World Bank with the WTO have provided useful 
platforms for the expansion of activities and programmes at a managerial and staff 
level to cover many trade issues.27  Fostering similar linkages on health and trade 
issues would facilitate the sharing of information and analysis, the monitoring and 
evaluation of policies, and allow greater transparency in discussions.  Of critical 
importance are the building of incentives for collaboration into such agreements in the 
form of funding and other resources. 
 Gaining leverage for achieving improved health representation in the WTO 
should initially focus on obvious areas of shared interest.  One example is infectious 
disease outbreaks which have the potential to adversely impact on global economic 
activity. The SARS outbreak in 2002-2003, and the perceived potential for pandemic 
influenza to inflict substantial damage on international commerce, has prompted 
unprecedented attention by major corporations and leading economies to outbreak 
preparedness. Thus, while the health community has so far focused on demonstrating 
how trade affects health, the importance of protecting health to trade concerns has 
been less clearly articulated. 
 Within WHO, to fulfil such hopes, commitment by WHO and its member 
states of sufficient resources to fund such efforts is needed.  While EBFs offer 
potentially substantial resources, they remain subject to the whims of major donors. 
Their reluctance to expand WHO’s role may be due to the lack of clear indicators or 
interventions to tackle health and trade issues, but also to perceived threats to vested 
economic interests.  Core resources from regular budget funds, to strengthen the 
organisation’s capacity to engage more actively in trade and health issues, must 
therefore be forthcoming. Similarly, appropriate technical expertise in WHO to 
analyse and advocate on trade and health matters remains inadequate.  Moreover, 
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different issues are tackled by different parts of the organisation, resulting in 
fragmentation and even competition among programmes.  WHO must also expand its 
efforts to shift, from building the knowledge base, to supporting member states to 
effectively participate in the governance of trade issues.  As well as building 
analytical capacity within member states, which requires corresponding resources, 
WHO must demonstrate political leadership in resisting powerful political and 
economic interests.  To date, WHO’s role has been reactive, with efforts focused on 
informing and building capacity within ministries of health to analyse the health 
implications of trade agreements already adopted.  With appropriate resources and 
high-level support, WHO could fulfil a more proactive and timely role in representing 
health interests in trade negotiations at the global, regional and national levels. 
 Adjustments among global institutions extend to their relationships with 
national level actors.  Ministries of health are especially disadvantaged by existing 
institutional configurations, and must be supported in their efforts to understand the 
technical aspects of trade agreements, and enabled to act accordingly to protect their 
health interests. To improve the analytical capacity that governments require to 
participate meaningfully in trade negotiations, WHO should work with ministries of 
health to strengthen what David Fidler calls ‘trade epidemiology.’28  This is the 
application of public health principles and methods in the formulation and 
implementation of trade policy through such activities as building an evidence-base 
for policy, monitoring and reporting on the health impacts of specific trade 
agreements; integrating public health expertise into negotiations of new agreements 
and arrangements; and enabling health interests a right to reply during the ‘cooling 
off’ periods for trade agreements. The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM), which regularly reviews and reports on the national trade policies of 
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member states, may be a model to follow.  WHO could adopt a similar process or 
partner with the WTO to provide health input into the TRPM process.  In the former, 
this would fit with the WHO Framework for Country Analysis, which would provide 
consistent, comparable information on trade policies and the impact of trade 
development.  WHO could also play a major role in providing training on the health-
related implications of trade agreements, not only to ministries of health, but also 
ministries of finance, foreign affairs, trade and commerce as documented in Uganda.29 
 Collaborative links across national governments could also be supported by 
WHO in the form of like-minded, pro-health coalitions.  LMICs, in particular, need to 
work in a more coordinated fashion within both WHO and the WTO. As on other 
trade issues, coalitions have increased their capacity, technical expertise and 
negotiating power.30 This could involve greater sharing of information among 
countries and, at an individual country level, among delegates who cover different 
areas.  This approach would strengthen the capacity of individual governments to 
monitor the complex and broad range of trade issues involved, and encourage 
collective positions that form the basis of lobbying and negotiations. 
 Alliance building should also be pursued among stakeholders at the country 
level. Within national governments, ministries of trade, finance and foreign affairs 
will rightfully remain the lead agencies in trade negotiations. The challenge for health 
ministries is to keep abreast of, and feed meaningfully into, national policy-making 
processes. Many governments recognise the importance of achieving greater 
coherence across different sectors through, for example, inter-ministerial committees. 
Greater parliamentary engagement and oversight in setting trade policies might also 
be encouraged so that broader welfare considerations, including health, will be taken 
into account.  For example, in 2001, the ministries of health and trade in the 
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Philippines launched President Macapagal-Arroya’s GMA 50 initiative focused on 
providing cheaper medicines through parallel importation.29  In Kenya, CSOs targeted 
parliamentarians to successfully prevent changes in IPR legislation that would have 
harmed access to affordable medicines.31  Given limited formal access of public 
interest groups to policy-making, health ministries could push for wider stakeholder 
consultation.  Health interests could be actively represented in the design of an initial 
offer, and effectively allowed to voice concerns and reservations with draft language. 
This should not be part of a one-time effort, but a continuing series of activities such 
as public workshops, public debates, and engagement with the media.  
 Outside governmental institutions, informal mechanisms can play a crucial 
role in trade and health governance. Although CSOs are not formally represented in 
negotiations at the WTO, they make a critical contribution by providing technical and 
practical assistance to LMICs, and mobilising public opinion to regulate the behaviour 
of powerful states and corporate interests.  CSOs have arguably been most effective in 
upholding public health protections when drawing on globally shared norms such as 
the international human rights framework and the work of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the right to health.  CSOs have been able to frame access to medicines, for 
example, as a moral rather than economic issue resulting in the WTO Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health.32 
 In conclusion, there are ample opportunities for trade and health to be 
mutually strengthened.  The complexity of the technical issues involved, powerful 
vested interests at play, and need for clear political leadership, has hindered the public 
health community from playing a more meaningful role where trade and health issues 
intersect.  These challenges must be overcome through a more strategic and 
coordinated approach that would contribute, not only to improved protection and 
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promotion of health, but to the creation of a more sustainable form of economic 
globalisation. 
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